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Introduction
Money is a universal commodity and the primary contemporary vehi-
cle used to facilitate trade. Markets preceded money, however, since
there is no need for money without markets.1 Barter, the primitive mar-
ket behavior that took place before money, was a process that entailed
people swapping goods for goods and services for services. 2 Barter trans-
actions are necessarily more cumbersome than transactions involving
money because of the difficulty of matching parties who desire to trade
their goods or services for those of another trader. There are also
problems of divisibility3 and quality of goods.4
Given barter's drawbacks, some economists in the 1960's were pre-
pared to relegate barter to a position of desuetude.5 The late 1960's,
however, saw the emergence in the international marketplace of a new
form of barter, known as countertrade. Countertrade is used to describe
a variety of transactions that make the sale of goods in an importing
country contingent upon the exporter's past or future purchases of goods
produced in that country. In some transactions, the original sales are
paid for with cash, but the sales are coupled with an agreement by the
seller to purchase goods in the future. Other agreements do not involve
the exchange of money at all, but only the exchange of goods. Transac-
tions involving countertrade were recently estimated to constitute fifteen
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Detroit.
1. R. TIMBERLAKE & E. SELBY, MONEY AND BANKING 3 (1972).
2. Id.
3. Barter transactions require both parties to trade items of equal value. If a horse is worth
50 chickens, then the horse trader must find someone with 50 chickens. A chicken trader with
only 25 chickens is not a good trading partner for the horse trader since the horse cannot be
divided in two and retain its value. Exchanges involving money, which has been divided into
very small denominations, do not present this divisibility problem.
4. The quality problem arises in modem countertrade when the products bargained for are
not in line with products received. It is often difficult, though, to return substandard products
because of the ongoing nature of the relationship between the traders and because the purchase
of the unsatisfactory product is related to the sale of another product. See infra note 69.
5. R. TIMBERLAKE & E. SELBY, supra note 1, at 3.
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to twenty percent of trade between OECD 6 countries and East European
countries, 7 and five to ten percent of total world trade.8
Part I of this Article describes the recent boom in countertrade, in
particular, governmentally imposed countertrade requirements, and dis-
cusses its economic impact on the world marketplace. Part II raises the
question of whether governmentally imposed countertrade requirements
constitute trade restrictions inconsistent with the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).9 The conclusion reached is that the prohibi-
tion on nontariff barriers contained in Article XI of the GATT is broad
enough to include countertrade within its proscription. But although
Article XI may thus serve as a potential instrument by which the increas-
ing use of countertrade could be regulated, the appropriateness of such a
course of action in light of economic circumstances present in the cur-
rent international marketplace remains an open question.
I. The Boom in Countertrade
A. Emergence of Modern Countertrade
Although countertrade emerged as a major component of world trade
in the late 1970's,1O the modern era of countertrade began during the
6. The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) was formed in
1948 to promote economic growth and development among West European and North Ameri-
can countries.
7. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 1983 ANNUAL REPORT ON EXCHANGE AR-
RANGEMENTS AND EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS 46 n.26. This estimate was made by the
OECD.
8. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 1985 ANNUAL REPORT ON EXCHANGE AR-
RANGEMENTS AND EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS 41 [hereinafter cited as 1985 IMF REPORT].
According one estimate, 10-20% of all world trade is done through some form of counter-
trade. P. VERZARIU, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRA-
TION, COUNTERTRADE PRACTICES IN EAST EUROPE, THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA: AN
INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO BUSINESS 5 (1980). Researchers at GATT estimate that 40% of
South/South trade is settled on a commodity-swapping basis. See Tomorrow Cowrie Shells,
THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 25, 1982, at 84. All of these estimates point out, though, that the
nature of countertrade transactions makes it inherently difficult to determine the extent of the
practice.
9. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter cited as GATI]. The GATT is an inter-
national agreement designed to facilitate the reduction of international trade barriers. Its goal
is the reciprocal reduction of tariffs and, in order to make such reductions effective, the elimi-
nation of nontariff barriers such as quotas. J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF
GATT 29 (1969). Thirty-three countries signed the original GAIT agreement on October 30,
1947. As of this writing, 90 countries have officially accepted the GATT. In addition, one
country has accepted it provisionally and 31 countries apply it de facto. GATT also refers to
the international organization, based in Geneva, which supervises the regime created by the
agreement.
10. Trade: A Payments Deficit Haunts Oil Consumers, Bus. WK., Feb. 9, 1974, at 37.
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post-World War I depression."1 The collapse of the gold standard ad-
justment mechanism led to the inconvertibility of many currencies and
the imposition of foreign exchange controls by many governments. 12
Since inconvertible money is little better than no money at all, traders
resorted to barter in order to consummate otherwise impossible interna-
tional transactions.
International bartering continued throughout the post-World War II
era, and many countertrade practices were formalized over time. In the
United States, for example, the Commodity Credit Corporation Charter
Act (CCC)1 3 and Section 303 of the Agricultural Trade Development
and Assistance Act of 195414 contained provisions authorizing the Secre-
tary of Agriculture to barter away surplus agricultural commodities
owned by the CCC in order to procure strategic supplies for a national
emergency stockpile.15 The barter program thrived for seventeen years,
fostering contracts worth more than $1.2 billion. 16 It was suspended in
1973 only when CCC stocks were largely depleted and the national
stockpiles no longer justified the need for a barter program.1 7 Western
governments still routinely engage in compensatory transactions, offset-
ting sales with purchases in the armaments and aviation industries.'
The barter contract has evolved along with the nature and frequency
of the barter transaction. The barter boom of the 1970's brought about
creative hybrids of this ancient practice accompanied by sophisticated
contractual arrangements. The governments of importing countries fre-
quently imposed complicated countertrade terms upon traders, and such
transactions assumed dominant roles in the world marketplace.
B. The Forms of Countertrade
The term "countertrade" embraces a broad and diverse collection of
trading arrangements. It "encompasses any commercial arrangement in
which purchases are made to offset sales as a means to reduce or restrict
11. P. VERZARIU, supra note 8, at 2.
12. D. VOGT, C. JABARA & D. LINSE, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DIVISION STAFF RE-
PORT, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, BARTER OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES 7 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as IED STAFF REPORT].
13. 15 U.S.C. § 714 (1982).
14. 7 U.S.C. § 1727(g) (1982). See also Disposal of Agricultural Commodities Under the
CCC Barter Program, 7 C.F.R. § 1495 (1985).
15. The Act also authorized barter agreements to obtain foreign-produced supplies and
services for United States agencies operating abroad.
16. P. VERZARIU, supra note 8, at 3.
17. IED STAFF REPORT, supra note 12, at 13.
18. P. VERZARIU, supra note 8, at 3.
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the flow of scarce hard currency across national boundaries." 19 Unlike
pure barter, which eliminates the use of money completely, 20 counter-
trade involves money in all but a very few transactions. 21 Countertrade
can be classified into several categories, including counterpurchase, com-
pensation, counterproduction, bilateral clearinghouse arrangements, and
switch trading. A particular transaction may exhibit similarities to one
or more of these groups.
1. Counterpurchase arrangements require exporters from the export-
ing state to purchase exports from the importing country. They are fre-
quently mandated by the foreign trade organization (FTO) of a state with
a non-market economy (NME) or by the government of a less-developed
country (LDC).22 A series of contracts are used to consummate the ar-
rangement.23 First, the seller and buyer contract for the initial sale of the
goods. The deal includes a cash settlement.24 In a separate contract, the
seller agrees to buy goods produced in the buyer's country in an amount
whose value is either equal to or some part of the value of the first con-
tract. A third financial instrument involving the seller's bank and the
buyer's bank, which usually includes credit guarantees or insurance, is
necessary. 25 Often the goods purchased by the seller (counter-deliver-
ables) are chosen from a range of products offered by the purchaser at the
time of the contract. If an FTO is involved, sometimes the counter-de-
liverables can be chosen from a different FrO than that of the purchaser.
Such an arrangement is called linkage.26
19. L. WELT, COUNTERTRADE: BUSINESS PRACTICES FOR TODAY'S WORLD MARKET 7
(1982). Countertrade has also been defined to include "all foreign trade transactions in which
an exporter commits himself to take products from an importer (or the importer's country) in
full or partial payment." BUSINESS INT'L CORP., THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES OF GLOBAL
COUNTERTRADE 3 (1984).
20. L. WELT, supra note 19, at 15.
21. Id. at 9. Pure barter is usually found in trade between non-market countries and poor
developing countries. Western countries occasionally engage in the practice when there is a
double coincidence of wants with nearly equivalent values. See id. at 15.
22. NME will be used to describe collectively Eastern Bloc countries (which include Bul-
garia, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the
Soviet Union) along with Yugoslavia, Cuba, Vietnam, and China. Developing countries with
or without state-controlled economies are described by the abbreviation LDC.
FTO's conduct foreign trade activities for countries in the East Bloc. There is an FTo
associated with each major industry. Traders have to negotiate deals with the FTO of the
industry related to the transaction. FrO's are responsible for conducting negotiations with
foreign firms and have the power to execute contracts. See P. VERZARIU, supra note 8, at 8.
23. Allan & Hiscock, East-West Trade: The Philosophies and Practicalities of State Trad-
ing, 8 MONASH U.L. REv. 135, 150 (1982).
24. Id. at 150-51.
25. Id.
26. L. WELT, supra note 19, at 16.
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The 1970 deal between Yugoslavia and McDonnell Douglas involving
the purchase of DC-9 transports is an example of counterpurchase. Mc-
Donnell Douglas agreed to serve as a U.S. marketing specialist for Yugo-
slav products in order to help Yugoslavia obtain the U.S. dollars
necessary to pay for the DC-9's. By 1976, McDonnell Douglas had pro-
moted the sale of over $16 million worth of Yugoslav products, including
ham (which it sold in its own cafeterias), steel pipe, iron castings, leather
goods, hand tools, and rubber products.27 Although the arrangement
was somewhat less formal than many counterpurchase schemes, the
transactions were clearly interdependent.
2. Compensation is the fastest growing form of countertrade in terms
of dollar value.2 8 Multinational companies often discover that in order
to sell equipment or machinery to a foreign government, the seller must
agree to buy back or market some percentage of the production output
that the equipment generates.2 9 Frequently, the equipment is sold for
cash, with a side contract committing the seller to purchase a certain
quantity of products produced.30 Compensatioh became popular in the
late 1960's in contracts between Western corporations and East Euro-
pean countries. The OECD countries' compensation exports of plant
and machinery to the Soviet Union and six East European countries be-
tween 1969 and 1980 attained a level of $30 billion to $48 billion. The
value of East European counter-deliverables generated from those sale
agreements was between $35 billion and $42 billion. 31
3. Counterproduction, a related form of countertrade, involves a mul-
tinational corporation setting up and supplying the equipment for an in-
dustrial plant in the receiving country. That country's FTO then
contracts to purchase the output of the plant.32 For this arrangement to
be of real benefit to the corporation, the state receiving the plant and
equipment must pay for the products in hard currency. Otherwise, the
corporation's use of the purchasing power generated by the sales would
be limited to trade with countries willing to accept that currency in
27. Oi for Weapons Barter Spurred, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., May 17, 1976, at 14.
28. L. WELT, supra note 19, at 18.
29. See U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMM'N, ANALYSIS OF RECENT TRENDS IN U.S.
COUNTERTRADE 13 (1982) [hereinafter cited as ITC ANALYSIS].
30. L. WELT, supra note 19, at 18.
31. De Miramon, Countertrade: A Modernized Barter System, OECD OBSERVER, Jan.
1982, at 12-13.
32. Allan & Hiscock, supra note 23, at 151. For an example of counterproduction de-
scribed as a joint venture, see the Regulations on Foreign Investment in the Socialist Republic
of Vietnam, Decree No. 115/CP, described in Quigley, Vietnam's Legal Regulation Of Foreign
Trade and Investment, 6 INT'L TRADE L.J. 24 (1980-81).
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exchange. Counterproduction is less popular than compensation and has
been used primarily in trades with East Bloc countries.
4. Countries can also arrange to trade with each other without using
money through bilateral clearinghouse accounts. In these types of trans-
actions, two countries agree to import a set volume of goods from each
other over a period of time.3 3 The agreement specifies the goods to be
exchanged and the exchange ratio.3 4 At the end of the period an ac-
counting is made. Any imbalance, called a "swing," can be made up by a
hard currency payment, by the issuance of a credit against the next year's
clearing account, or by sales to third parties.35
5. States' desires to eliminate the swing or trade imbalance has re-
sulted in a form of countertrade known as switch trading. In switch trad-
ing a third country is involved. For example, countries W and E have a
bilateral clearinghouse agreement. Country W discovers that it has no
use for a certain value of products scheduled for exchange under the
agreement, or country W may discover that it has a trade surplus for
other reasons. W can transfer its swing to a switch trading house which
uses the credits in a series of transactions that eventually result in a hard
currency exchange. 36
C. Why Countertrade?
All of these carefully developed arrangements are evidence of the will-
ingness of companies and states to trade with one another in transactions
involving more than a mere exchange of money. The recent proliferation
of countertrade agreements is a strong indication that all parties involved
are sufficiently attracted to the benefits of countertrade to accept its bur-
dens. This modem form of barter has thus become extremely popular,
even though money is more efficient and easier with which to deal.
The traditional explanation for the popularity of countertrade is that
barter reemerges during periods of economic stagnation, when money
becomes scarce, or when other forms of market imperfections are pres-
ent.37 Principally, countertrade results when currencies decrease in con-
vertibility and states find themselves unable to obtain the hard foreign
currency needed to conduct international trade.38 But although currency
33. L. WELT, supra note 19, at 23.
34. ITC ANALYSIS, supra note 29, at 6-7. Exchange ratio refers to the relative values
established for the products set aside for trade.
35. Id. at 7.
36. See BUSINESS INT'L CORP., supra note 19, at 68-75; Allan & Hiscock, supra note 23, at
151; Barter is Respectable, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 29, 1966, at 428.
37. 1985 IMF REPORT, supra note 8, at 41.
38. See L. WELT, supra note 19, at 7-8; IED STAFF REPORT, supra note 12, at 12.
196
Vol. 11:191, 1985
Countertrade and the GATT
shortages may constitute the primary impetus for countertrade, they do
not sufficiently explain the magnitude of the current practice. 39 Since
billions of dollars of countertrade transactions have been consummated
with multinational corporations and countries experiencing no currency
exchange problems, other factors obviously play a large role.
The existence of surplus goods makes countertrade an attractive op-
tion to many governments. States with price support programs often use
barter to reduce excess supplies while minimizing the price reductions
which would result from selling the surplus on the open market. 4° The
artificially high price for the surplus goods can be maintained by inflating
the prices of the goods for which they are exchanged. If the United
States, for example, had surplus non-fat dried milk as a result of its agri-
cultural production support programs and attempted to sell that surplus
on the world market, the price of dried milk would'fall, defeating the
purpose of the program. If, instead, the United States arranged to trade
the dried milk for Jamaican bauxite, an exchange rate could be negoti-
ated assigning a premium price to the bauxite, resulting in the sale of the
dried milk at a discount while its high price is seemingly maintained.41
Countertrade has also developed in order to ensure continued access to
scarce commodities. Two countries can exchange essential resources, as-
suring both parties ample supplies for a specified time period.42 Counter-
trade has been a particularly common method, for example, of ensuring
oil supplies. 43 Similarly, compensation deals can provide multinational
39. Most countertrade transactions have one or more parties who are an LDC or an NME.
With respect to the NME's, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON or
CMEA) acts a giant clearinghouse for countertrade among its members. New Restrictions on
World Trade, Bus. WK., July 19, 1982, at 118, 121. The NME's discussed in this article are
also members of CMEA. See supra note 22. NME's cope with the foreign exchange problem
by not draining their scarce currency resources in trade among themselves. Countertrade be-
tween LDC's and NME's is less organized, but their mutual currency problems draw them
into an array of countertrade arrangements.
40. IED STAFF REPORT, supra note 12, at 7-8.
41. For a description of the 1982 barter of U.S. dairy products for Jamaican bauxite, see
Note, Bauxite for Butter: The US.-Jamaican Agreement and the Future of Barter in US.
Trade Policy, 16 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 239 (1984).
Countertrade has similarly been used by OPEC to deceptively maintain an artificially high
world oil price. Through the manipulation of exchange ratios, an OPEC country can use
countertrade to sell oil effectively below the OPEC price. Countries take advantage of this
practice to lower prices and thereby attract customers without officially violating price guide-
lines, since the value of the imported goods is not stated in monetary terms. L. WELT, supra
note 19, at 9. See also Barter Deals Cut the Price of Oil, Bus. WK., May 12, 1975, at 30.
42. IED STAFF REPORT, supra note 12, at 7.
43. By negotiating sales of supplies and equipment as a side deal to oil purchases, Japan
was able to create exports and jobs during the oil crisis. This helped to minimize the impact of
increasing oil prices on Japan's industries. Similarly, Germany increased investments in oil
exporting countries in exchange for oil, and France traded arms for oil. See Janeway, The
Opportunities for Bartering are Endless, INFOSYSTEMS, Sept. 1979, at 88.
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corporations with guaranteed sources of supply of output from produc-
tion facilities in NME's or LDC's, usually on particularly favorable
terms. Since the buy-back provisions extend for periods of up to twenty-
five years, the corporation can lock in the price and the source of supply
for a substantial period of time.
Countertrade is also used by LDC's and NME's to effectuate the trans-
fer of goods, services, and technologies while minimizing the impact of
such transfers on the trade balances of the importing country.44 Oil-im-
porting LDC's in particular have suffered hard currency shortages in the
wake of the 1970's oil price increases. Many such states view counter-
trade as a way to fulfill their import needs despite currency depletion. 45
Fluctuating demand for the exports of LDC's also cause them to look to
countertrade as a way to control variations in their import capacity. By
tying imports to exports, they stabilize their ability to implement indus-
trialization.46 LDC's also often erect tariffs and strict import licensing
criteria in order to encourage multinational corporations to locate plants
within the LDC, rather than to merely export goods to the country.47
NME's use countertrade when they have exceeded expenditures desig-
nated in their five year plans prior to meeting their expansion goals.48 In
the 1970's, the Soviet Union and the East Bloc countries embarked on
industrial modernization plans, greatly increasing demand for capital
goods from the West. NME planners hoped to offset this demand by
expanded industrial production. Poor implementation of the programs
and lack of demand for East Bloc products led to serious balance of trade
problems. As a result, the central planning apparatus in each country
demanded that its foreign trade organization impose countertrade obliga-
tions as a prerequisite to trade.49 Others have suggested that NME's
favor countertrade both because of the shortage of foreign currency and
because NME planners tend to think in terms of output as opposed to
money.50
44. McVey, Countertrade and Barter: Alternative Trade Financing by Third World Na-
tions, 6 INT'L. TRADE L.J. 197 (1980-81).
45. Id. at 198.
46. See L. WELT, supra note 19, at 58.
47. See Fontheim & Gadbaw, Trade-Related Performance Requirements under the GA7T-
MTN System and U.S. Law, 14 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 129, 130-32 (1982).
48. ITC ANALYSIS, supra note 29, at 10.
49. L. WELT, supra note 19, at 46.
50. Barter is Respectable, supra note 36, at 429.
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D. Government Involvement in Countertrade
While countertrade can occur between private parties, governmentally
imposed countertrade requirements arouse special concern. Government
involvement in countertrade can take a variety of forms. Governments
can directly or indirectly impose countertrade requirements. 51 They can
also assist domestic companies in negotiating countertrade arrangements
with countries that do impose countertrade requirements. Finally, gov-
ernments can actively look for countertrade opportunities in order to im-
prove trade balances and business vitality during times of economic
recession or currency fluctuation. Although government involvement
may take more than one of these forms, NME's and LDC's have com-
monly engaged in the first variety of government involvement. Western
governmental involvement has more frequently been of the latter two
varieties. 52
France is an example of a Western government which actively pro-
motes countertrade transactions. L'Association Pour la Compensation
des Echanges Commerciaux (ACECO) was formed by the French gov-
ernment in 1978. It consists of bankers, industrialists, and government
officials who advise French companies on how to handle countertrade
transactions. 53 In the early 1980's, TECNIP, France's state-owned engi-
neering and construction company, developed its own trading depart-
ment and negotiated a compensation deal with the People's Republic of
China that involved construction of a brewery and buy-back of beer. The
French government has become involved in countertrade both in an advi-
sory role and by active pursuit of arrangements beneficial to French
companies. 54
The governments of Germany and Japan have also used countertrade
to help decrease trade deficits and increase domestic productivity. In the
late 1970's, some analysts attributed those countries' excellent trade posi-
tions, despite the world-wide recession, to their effective use of counter-
trade.55 The governments of both countries successfully swapped job-
creating exports for oil imports. These deals both increased productivity
and helped to assure each country a supply of oil in an unstable market-
place. Japan provided $160 million worth of supplies and equipment for
51. See Zarin, Countertrade and the Law, 18 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 235 (1984).
52. For examples of governmental involvement in North-South countertrade, see Walsh,
Countertrade: Not Just For East-West Any More, 17 J. WORLD TRADE L. 3, 6-8 (1983).
53. Europe: The Disruptive Impact of East Bloc Barters, Bus. WK., Jan. 23, 1978, at 42.
54. Barter Deals Gaining Favor in International Contracting, ENGINEERING NEWS REC.,
Sept. 9, 1982, at 69 (also describing countertrade requirements made by governments of Indo-
nesia and Libya).
55. Janeway, supra note 43, at 88.
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oil exploration to Indonesia, in return for one-half of the oil produced.
Germany offered increased investment in the United Kingdom in ex-
change for increased supplies of North Sea oil to be processed in Ger-
many. Germany and Japan have similarly exchanged technology for oil
with Mexico.5 6 In the 1970's, as a result of increased OPEC oil prices,
Germany and Japan experienced the same currency drain as other oil-
importing countries. However, the impact upon their economies proved
less dramatic because of their governments' effective use of countertrade
to promote exports which offset the increased cost of oil imports.
The governments of NME's and LDC's that are actively involved in
countertrade may enforce their policies either directly, or indirectly-
such as by granting import licenses only to importers who have met in-
formal countertrade requirements.5 7 Countertrade is encouraged, for ex-
ample, by nearly all NME's, but it is legally imposed only in Romania.58
Similarly, most LDC's do not directly mandate countertrade, but en-
courage countertrade by denying import licenses for categories of goods
produced domestically.5 9 As one observer has noted:
Countertrade mandates can originate from a variety of government-
related sources in the Third World: trade regulations, banks, investment
boards, tax regulations, tax review boards, ministries of finance, ministries
of trade, state-owned corporations and state trading firms. Though prac-
tices vary from country to country, all lesser developed countries have in-
vestment screening boards which frequently mandate countertrade.
These boards often do not explicitly impose export performance criteria
on investment proposals. But almost always, in the absence of such explicit
criteria, export performance requirements are informally imposed.60
Because of the nature of their political systems, Western governments
are less able to intervene and promote countertrade deals than are gov-
ernments of countries where the economy is state-controlled. For exam-
ple, when the United States entered into barter deals to trade away
agricultural surpluses, the government did not negotiate the barters di-
rectly. Offers to export products held by the Commodity Credit Corpo-
ration were solicited from private United States firms. 61
56. Id.
57. See lanni, State Trading: Its Nature and International Treatment, 5 Nw. J. INT'L. L.
& Bus. 46 (1983) (discussing state trading and the special treatment given communist and
socialist countries under the GATT).
58. De Miramon, supra note 31, at 14.
59. See L. WELT, supra note 19, at 46-54.
60. L. WELT, TRADE WITHOUT MONEY: BARTER AND COUNTERTRADE 101-02 (1984).
61. IED STAFF REPORT, supra note 12, at 13.
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E. The Effects of Countertrade on Competition and Economic
Efficiency
Although "[tihe origins of money are lost in antiquity, '6 2 the efficiency
of money over barter led most primitive societies to develop currencies at
an early stage of development.6 3 The fungibility and divisibility of
money give a trader freedom to select between a wide variety of products
with little concern for the needs of the seller beyond the price. The ad-
vantages of currency notwithstanding, countertrade has developed as a
tool upon which many modern governments have relied extensively." 4
Yet, although there may be short-term policy considerations which lead
a government to adopt countertrade requirements, such practices are
economically inefficient and, in the long run, ultimately restrict rather
than expand trade.65
According to Ricardo's classic doctrine of comparative advantage in
international trade, a country will export products in which it has com-
parative production efficiency and it will import products in which it has
a comparative productive disadvantage.6 6 In this way, each country
maximizes its productivity by using its resources most efficiently. 67 The
world marketplace, accordingly, operates efficiently because the individ-
ual countries' efficient production translates into lower prices and better
quality for every traded good. Resources are freed for production of
more goods, expanding the overall level of world trade.68
Countertrade and barter, however, can introduce inefficiencies into
trading relationships that reduce mutual advantages from trade and actu-
ally restrict the level of world trade. The long-term trade restrictive ef-
fect of countertrade or barter can be analyzed in two ways. First, when
money is used as the medium of exchange, income derived from one ex-
change can quickly be returned to the marketplace for use in new trades.
If, however, a trader is required to take goods instead of money, the
trader must either convert those goods into money, by finding a buyer
willing to pay money for them, or exchange the goods for other goods. If
the trader opts for the latter course, but cannot use the goods received in
62. R. LIPSEY & P. STEINER, ECONOMICS 591 (3d. ed. 1972).
63. Id.
64. See supra notes 22-36 and accompanying text.
65. See Huh, Countertrade: Trade without Cash?, FIN. & DEv., Dec. 1983, at 14, 15-16;
1985 IMF REPORT, supra note 8, at 41-42. See also Fontheim & Gadbaw, supra note 47, at
134-39 (discussing economic impact on the marketplace of trade-related performance
requirements).
66. See P. LINDERT & C. KINDLEBERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS ch. 2 (7th ed.
1982).
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., D. GOWLAND, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS ch. 2 (1983).
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exchange for the original goods, the trader must repeat the process until
he or she receives either usable goods or money. Barter thus slows down
the exchange process, resulting in increased costs in the form of higher
transaction, information, and opportunity costs. 69 A portion of the
"gains from trade" are lost in this inefficient form of non-money
exchange.70
Second, countertrade can produce long-term inefficiencies by encour-
aging investment in forms of production in which a country lacks com-
parative advantage. Normally, consumers seek to purchase from the
producer who sells at the lowest price with the highest quality. Efficient
producers are encouraged to produce more while less efficient producers
face pressures either to leave the market, thereby diverting their re-
sources to different production, or to increase their efficiency. Counter-
trade interferes with this market mechanism and results in less efficient
production. For example, a consumer may have to purchase from a
higher cost/lower quality seller who will accept the purchaser's counter-
trade demands. 71 In the short-term, both parties to the trade may appear
to benefit, but in the long-term, an inefficient seller is encouraged to re-
main in production, rather than diverting its resources to more highly
productive uses.72
69. According to practioners, there are a host of hidden expenses and problems associated
with countertrade:
(1) Countertrade involves time-consuming negotiations. Particularly in the case of NME's,
rivalry among the various foreign trade organizations may cause expensive delays in negotia-
tion and delivery. In addition, the market value of the goods involved in the transaction may
change during the negotiating process. See IED STAFF REPORT, supra note 12, at 9.
(2) As in any transaction, it is difficult to assess the quality of goods received in counter-
trade deals. It is much more difficult than in other deals, however, to reject countertraded
items as being of insufficient quality. Id.
(3) Goods subject to countertrade must frequently be discounted in order to resell them. To
accomodate that discount, the value given them in the countertrade negotiations must be
marked up. Fluctuations in the market price or the discount rate can cause loss of profit. See
Black, Barter Surfaces as International Trade Tool, IRON AGE, Nov. 2, 1972, at 39.(4) Shipping fees, agent fees, and currency discounting can also reduce profits. Id.
70. See P. LINDERT & C. KINDLEBERGER, supra note 66, at ch. 8.
71. For example, assume Producer A from Country A and Producer B from Country B
both produce fish hooks. Producer A produces at a total cost of $.01 per hook and sells the
hooks for $.015 per hook. Producer B produces hooks at a cost of $.012 per hook and sells
them for $.016 per hook. Producer A's hooks are sturdier and easier to use than Producer B's
hooks. Consumer C from Country LDC imports fish hooks and receives offers for sale from
Producers A and B. Consumer C decides to purchase from Producer A, who applies for an
import license. Consumer C and Producer A are informed by the licensing authority of Coun-
try LDC that no license will be issued unless Producer A agrees to purchase a specified dollar
amount of products produced in Country LDC. If Producer A is unwilling to accept the terms
of the deal, but Producer B is, these non-market considerations will determine the outcome of
the transaction. Moreover, because of the likelihood Producer B will experience difficulties in
marketing the countertraded goods, it will probably increase its price an additional amount.
72. In the example above, consumers in Country LDC pay more for the fish hooks. Pro-
ducer B is encouraged to stay in the business of producing fish hooks even though it is a less
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Countertrade thus frequently results in a different match of buyers and
sellers from what would have resulted in a "money-only" transaction.
Although in bilateral terms, trade is facilitated on a one-shot basis, the
multilateral trading regime is harmed. This corrosive effect of counter-
trade on the multilateral trading system has evoked many expressions of
concern. According to Jacques de Miramon, the OECD Trade Director:
From the point of view of the general interest of OECD countries, which is
to safeguard an open multilateral trading system, countertrade is backward:
it runs counter to the progress made in liberalising trade since the last
World War. It is a return to bilateralism through a modernised barter sys-
tem. It recalls the restricted choice that is characteristic of wartime econo-
mies and compartmentalised markets, whereas the policies pursued
succesfully for the last thirty years by the OECD countries have aimed at
opening markets, increasing opportunities for trade and improving com-
mercial practices. 73
Similarly, the International Monetary Fund has expressed concern
about the impact of increased government-sponsored countertrade on the
world trade system:
[T]he proliferation of [countertrade] practices is detrimental to the mainte-
nance of the multilateral system of trade and payments. Countertrade prac-
tices may entail many of the undesirable restrictive and discriminatory
practices traditionall, associated with bilateralism. .... 74
Countertrade ultimately constitutes a retreat from the post-World War
II multilateral trading regime. Thus, the GATT, which created and for-
malized that regime, should be examined as a possible tool for limiting
the growth of countertrade.
II. Countertrade and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade is the most influential
international mechanism available for the regulation of international
trade. Through GATT, member states monitor the activities of one an-
other in an effort to promote a less restricted world marketplace. The
efficient allocation of resources and the maximization of economic output
are widely recognized as the most important goals of the GATT.75
efficient producer, whereas if normal market conditions had prevailed, Producer B may have
diverted its resources to another industry. Producer A loses a share of the market and, in the
most pessimistic scenario, may eventually leave the industry. Alternatively, Producer A may
find other buyers or accept countertrade conditions in future transactions.
73. De Miramon, supra note 31, at 15.
74. 1985 IMF REPORT, supra note 8, at 41.
75. J. JACKSON, supra note 9, at 5.
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Lacking meaningful direct sanctions, 76 GATT achieves its purposes
through the concept of mutually advantageous and reciprocal trade con-
cessions.77 Most Favored Nation (MFN) status, the GATT's corner-
stone,78 is a shorthand phrase used to describe the process whereby one
state grants to another state trade advantages equal to the most favorable
concessions granted to any other state. The effect is that artificially im-
posed trade barriers such as tariffs and quotas lose their impact on one
MFN country's ability to compete with another MFN country for a
share of the importing country's market. The concept of MFN perme-
ates the GATT, carrying with it a mandate of equal treatment and non-
discrimination. That sense of fairness has become a part of the GATT
review process and is reflected I decisions of the Contracting Parties. 79
The coercive power of the GATT is limited by its status as an agree-
ment among sovereign states. The Contracting Parties recognize that
they are judging the activities and trade practices of a sovereign, and if
prevailed upon too egregiously, that sovereign may ignore the Agreement
or withdraw. As a result, the Contracting Parties have evidenced a gen-
tle touch in addressing violations of the GATT. The lack of enforcement
methods has led to discrepancies between the practices of the Con-
tracting Parties and the technical rules of the GATT.80 When such di-
vergencies occur, the reaction often has been either to change the GATT
rule, or to ignore the practices, hoping for a return to an adherence to the
rule.81
76. Id. at 16. GATT's primary sanctions are:
(1) The withdrawal of concessions substantially equal in value to the amounts lost as a
result of the violation of the GATT. See GATT, supra note 9, arts. XII, XIX, XXIII, and
XXVIII.
(2) Notice and consultation requirements upon the advent of certain changes in trade pol-
icy. See id. arts. VI, XIII, XIX, XXII, XXIII, XXIV, and XXV.
(3) Imposition of duties against violators. See id. art. VI.
77. J. JACKSON, supra note 9, at 519.
78. J. JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 515
(1977). See also J. JACKSON, supra note 9, ch. 11.
79. "The Contracting Parties" designates all the members of GATT, acting as a body, as
opposed to "a contracting party," which designates an individual member of GATT. When a
contracting party believes that the actions of another contracting party are inconsistent with
the Agreement, the Agreement calls for the disputing parties to consult with one another. If
the consultation does not result in a satisfactory resolution, either contracting party can re-
quest that the Contracting Parties study the matter. The Contracting Parties through the
GATT Council (an administrative organ appointed by the Contracting Parties to administer
the Agreement) appoints a Panel. The Panel studies the problem, reviews reports submitted
by all contracting parties involved in the dispute, and prepares a report for the Contracting
Parties that includes the Panel's recommendations. See J. JACKSON, supra note 9, at 124-25.
80. Id. at 16.
81. See generally id. ch. 29.
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As suggested above, countertrade is an increasingly common trade
practice which is ultimately inefficient and trade-restrictive. The issues
of countertrade and its effects on the world trading regime, however, are
currently receiving relatively little attention under the GATT.8 2 This
section will examine whether countertrade is inconsistent with the
GATT. The language of the Agreement, case history, and economic
analysis suggest that contracting parties could work within the frame-
work of the Agreement to reverse the trend toward countertrade.
A. The Scope of the GAMT's Prohibition on Non-Tariff Barriers
1. The Terms of the GATT
Countertrade has been criticized by GATT as a distortion of multilat-
eral trade and an impediment to economic efficiency. 83 The question ad-
dressed herein is whether countertrade is a restrictive trade practice
already prohibited by the explicit terms of the Agreement.
Article XI of the GATT prohibits the institution of trade restrictions
other than duties, taxes, or other charges.84 Quotas are the primary tar-
get of Article XI. Quotas are the most severe barriers to trade since they
absolutely prohibit trade; after the designated quota amount of a particu-
lar product is imported, no more units of that product are allowed into
the country imposing the quota until the commencement of a new quota
period. While tariffs, duties, and taxes affect the competitive price of the
product and may affect the market position of the exporter, trade
82. But see GATT, Countertrade and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Doe.
CG.18/W/80 (March 30, 1984), noted in S. ANTARIA, N. KIRMANI & A. PETERSON, TRADE
POLICY ISSUES AND DEVELOPMENTS 78 (IMF Occasional Paper No. 38, 1985). In this report,
the GATT Secretariat concludes that while countertrade in and of itself does not violate the
GATT, "governmental measures that require, stimulate or take the form of countertrade, or
that react to countertrade, can be inconsistent with obligations under the General Agreement
or the Codes."
83. Birley, Can't Pay? Will Pay, But In Sultanas, EUROMONEY, May 1983, at 187.
Although often criticized by states, many governments have reconciled themselves to counter-
trade as a necessary evil and have begun to provide advisory services. Id.
The Director-General of GAIT, Arthur Dunkel, has warned against bilateralism and
sectoralism in trade policy, with direct reference to countertrade: "A foreign trade policy has
to consider national trade needs globally; as sectoral arrangements proliferate, coherent policy-
making becomes impossible, and economic efficiency is lost at every stage." GA TT's Director-
General Warns Against Bilateralism and Sectoralism in Trade Policy, GAT Focus, March
1982, at 4.
84. Article XI picks up where Article II, which establishes tariff schedules, leaves off. En-
titled "General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions," Article XI deals with trade restric-
tion other than tariffs. Paragraph 1 provides:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made
effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or
maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of
any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product des-
tined for the territory of any other contracting party. (Emphasis added).
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nonetheless continues. With quotas, however, the entry of products be-
yond the quota amount is barred.
Tariff concessions resulting in the reduction of tariffs are ineffective in
achieving the goal of promoting trade if a party is unable to trade as a
result of non-tariff barriers. Quotas and other forms of well-cloaked
trade restrictions thus operate to reduce the value of mutual tariff reduc-
tions. Exporters cannot sell their goods if they are unable to overcome
hidden barriers to trade, such as governmentally imposed countertrade
requirements.
Article XI and its companion Articles XII, XIII, and XIV pertain to
quantitative restrictions.85 These articles are more complex, and were
more difficult to draft and negotiate, than any other group of regulations
in the Agreement. 86 The United States was determined to eliminate quo-
tas through the GATT,87 and the elimination of quantitative restrictions
has been described as the Agreement's most significant contribution to
world trade.88
Countertrade usually does not involve quotas, but nonetheless may fall
within the scope of Article XI. Article XI refers to "prohibitions or re-
strictions. . . whether made effective through quotas, import or export
licenses or other measures .... ,,89 Even though the primary intent of
the drafters was to eliminate quotas, they also intended to reach other
forms of trade restrictions or prohibitions not involving quotas. The lan-
guage in Article XI thus applies to restrictive trade practices other than
formal quotas.90 Furthermore, the Notes and Supplementary Provisions
85. Article XI prohibits the use of quotas. Article XII provides an exception to Article XI
permitting the imposition of certain import restrictions when a country's balance of payments
is threatened. Article XII will not provide an escape for most countries mandating counter-
trade for balance of payments reasons, due to the limitations built into the Article in paragraph
2. Only those measures necessary to stop, or to forestall the imminent threat of, a serious
decline in monetary reserves, or to achieve a reasonable rate of increase in reserves, are permis-
sible. Any country imposing such measures must progressively relax them as such conditions
improve, maintaining the restrictions only to the extent that conditions justify. Thus, coun-
tries imposing countertrade requirements may not qualify for an Article XII exception, and
they certainly have not consulted with affected countries prior to the implementation of any
restriction as Article XII requires.
86. See I. JACKSON, supra note 9, ch. 13.
87. Id. at 306-07.
88. Id.
89. GATT, supra note 9, art. XI(1) (emphasis added).
90. See Liebman, GA7T and Countertrade Requirements, 18 . WORLD TRADE L. 252,
254 (1984) (discussing Article XI and other provisions of the GATT which might be violated
as a result of government imposed countertrade requirements, notably the potential conflict
between bilateral countertrade requirements and MFN).
Zarin, supra note 51, at 242, argues that "[g]ovemment-mandated countertrade arrange-
ments arguably violate the spirit, if not the letter, of GATT." He proposes that such counter-
trade requirements violate not only Article XI, but also Articles XII, XVII, and XXIII. The
article discusses at length U.S. laws which might apply to countertrade transactions. For fur-
ther discussion on the application of U.S. law to countertrade, see McVey, Countertrade:
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to the GATT define the terms "import restrictions" or "export restric-
tions" to include "restrictions made effective through state trading
operations." 91
2. Application of Article XI
Such language suggests that an expansive interpretation should be ap-
plied to the mandate of Article XI. However, caution must be exercised
in the application of the GATT provisions to trade practices, for as Pro-
fessor Jackson suggests:
The starting point of any interpretation or application is of course the
words of the treaty itself. Even at this beginning point, however, it must be
recognized that certain clauses of GATT do not reflect the currently ac-
cepted practice ... . [E]ven though appropriate clauses in GATT are dis-
covered to be relevant to a particular situation, the extent to which a
particular clause has been accepted by nations, or applies to their particular
practices in the face of the large number of exceptions possible, is a complex
question which must be approached with considerable caution.92
Thus, prior to concluding that Article XI applies to trade restrictions
other than quotas, such as governmentally imposed countertrade require-
ments, the reality of international practices should be examined. Any
use by the Contracting Parties of Article XI to challenge trade restric-
tions other than quotas would serve as a good indication that member
states perceive Article XI to have a broader scope. Such perceptions of
member states with regard to the application of Article XI to govern-
mentally imposed countertrade requirements are perhaps more impor-
tant than a concise interpretion of the language of the treaty.
Despite the common view that there is no stare decisis in international
law,93 under the GATT previous practice has an important influence on
the interpretation and application of the treaty. Even so, the applicabil-
ity of the treaty to a situation should not be rejected merely because the
treaty section was not-applied to those facts previously. While looking
for evidence that Article XI applies to trade restrictions other than quo-
tas, the possibility of new developments should not be foreclosed.
Commercial Practices, Legal Issues and Policy Dilemmas, 16 LAw & PoL'Y INT'L Bus 1, 35-56
(1984).
This Article focuses primarily on Article XI because the close relationship between govern-
ment-mandated countertrade and the restrictions prohibited in Article XI. The strongest ar-
gument that countertrade violates the GATT is based on Article XI.
91. GATT, supra note 9, Annex I, Ad Articles XI, XII, XIII, and XVII.
92. J. JACKSON, supra note 9, at 19-20.
93. W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 39 (3d ed. 1971).
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Most invocations of Article XI have been in response to quotas. In
three recent cases, however, contracting parties have invoked this provi-
sion in seeking relief from non-quota trade restrictions.
a. French Restrictions on Hong Kong Products
According to a Working Panel report adopted in 1983,94 France has
developed a unique, non-quota method of restricting imports. In an ef-
fort to reduce a wave of imports from Hong Kong, several classes of
imported products were effectively restricted by France, without imposi-
tion of a quota, by withholding or slowing down approval of import
licenses on those products. The United Kingdom claimed, on behalf of
Hong Kong, that this practice constituted discriminatory bilateral treat-
ment of Hong Kong.
France defended its actions by asserting that economic and social con-
cerns gave rise to the restrictions. 95 The United Kingdom argued in re-
sponse that exceptions to Article XI should be limited to measures
described in paragraph two of that article, 96 and that all other "prohibi-
tions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges" were for-
bidden. It denied that any provision was made for exemptions based
upon economic or social grounds.97
The Panel agreed that France violated Article XI and Article XIII,
because the French import licensing procedure resulted in import restric-
tions with the same impact upon imports as a quota.98 For the present
analysis, the notable aspect of the France-Hong Kong controversy was
94. E.E. C. Quantitative Restrictions Against Imports of Certain Products from Hong Kong,
CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC
INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS, 30TH Supp. 129 (1984) [hereinafter cited as
Hong Kong Products].
95. Id. at 132.
96. The exceptions in paragraph 2 of Article XI are:
The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not extend to the following:
(a) Export prohibitions or restrictions temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical
shortages of foodstuffs or other products essential to the exporting contracting party;
(b) Import and export prohibitions or restrictions necessary to the application of stan-
dards or regulations for the classification, grading or marketing of commodities in inter-
national trade;
(c) Import restrictions on any agricultural or fisheries product, imported in any form,
necessary to the enforcement of governmental measures which operate:
(i) to restrict the quantities of the like domestic product permitted to be marketed or
produced ....
(ii) to remove a temporary surplus. ...
(iii) to restrict the quantities permitted to be produced of any animal product the
production of which is directly dependent, wholly or mainly, on the imported commodity,
if the domestic production of that commodity is relatively negligible.
GAIT, supra note 9, art. XI.
97. Hong Kong Products, supra note 94, at 132.
98. Id. at 140.
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the willingness of the Contracting Parties to look beyond the direct im-
position of quotas to other indirect means of establishing import restric-
tions which violate the provisions of Article XI.
b. The Canadian Foreign Investment Review Act
In a second case, government policies with a far less directly restrictive
effect on imports were held not to violate Article XI. Under the "Cana-
dian Act," potential foreign investors in Canada were required to gain
prior authorization from the Canadian government. 99 That approval was
contingent upon factors which included the use of Canadian products
and labor in the venture, Canadian ownership, the effect upon productiv-
ity, and competition with existing Canadian business. In order to gain
government approval, investors were required to agree to "undertakings"
that included the purchase of Canadian products, the manufacture of
products in Canada, and the development of exports.1 0
The United States challenged the Canadian requirements as discrimi-
natory against foreign investors. The Canadian Act was reviewed by a
GATT panel after consultations between Canada and the United States
failed to resolve the dispute. 101 The United States requested the Panel to
find that the Canadian Act obliged foreign investors: (1) to purchase
goods of Canadian origin in preference to imported goods; (2) to manu-
facture goods which would otherwise be imported; and (3) to export
specified quantities or proportions of their production.10 2 Article XI was
among the provisions in the GATT which the United States claimed the
Canadian Act violated,10 3 arguing that the purchase undertakings oper-
ated as a restriction on the importation of products into Canada.1 04
The Panel adopted the Canadian position that the GATT distinguishes
between measures affecting the importation of products which are regu-
lated in Article XI and those affecting imported products which are dealt
with in Article 111.105 Since the purchase undertakings did not actually
prevent the importation of goods, the Panel reached the conclusion that
they were consistent with Article XI.10 6 The United States' decision to
99. See Canada-Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act, CONTRACTING
PARTIES TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS
AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS, 30TH Supp. 140 (1984).
100. Id. at 142-44.
101. Id. at 140.
102. Id. at 146.
103. Other GATT articles used by the U.S. to argue against the Canadian Act were Arti-
cles 111(4), 111(5), XVII(l)(c), and XXIII. Id. at 146.
104. See id. at 152.
105. Id. at 162.
106. Id. at 163. The report states:
The Panel did not find, either in the drafting history of the General Agreement or in
previous cases examined by the CONTRACTING PARTIES, any evidence justifying such an
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invoke Article XI to challenge the policy, however, remains significant.
In addition, even though the Panel did not accept the U.S. argument,
neither did it openly reject the applicability of Article XI to the Canadian
policy.107
c. U.S.-Canada Patent Dispute
In another Panel report adopted the same year, Canada complained of
a United States International Trade Commission order excluding from
importation into the United States certain automotive spring assemblies
which had been found to violate a United States patent.108 Canada as-
serted that "[t]he exclusion order. . . was inconsistent with the obliga-
tions of the United States under Article XI(1) ... ."9 The United
States contended that "it was not the intent of Article XI to prohibit
restriction[s] on products found to infringe a patent or to violate other
national laws of general applicability." 110
The Panel decided that the United States' exclusion was not inconsis-
tent with Article XX(d), reaching no conclusion on the application of
Article XI.III Again, it is noteworthy that Canada invoked Article XI to
challenge a practice which did not involve quotas. The United States, in
turn, did not argue that Article XI should be restricted in its application
to quotas, but instead maintained that the exclusion fell outside Article
XI.112
In both of the Canada-United States disputes, the parties indicated a
willingness to apply the language of Article XI quite broadly to non-
quota trade barriers. The cases discussed above do not resolve the extent
of Article XI's applicability to different import restrictions that do not
involve quotas. They support the proposition, however, that the Article
should be interpreted as being consistent with the most obvious meaning
of its language. The France-Hong Kong controversy also demonstrates
interpretation of Article XI. For these reasons, the Panel, noting that purchase undertak-
ings do not prevent the importation of goods as such, reached the conclusion that they are
[not] inconsistent with Article XI:I.
See also id. at 165 ("the Panel reached the conclusion that they [the purchase undertakings]
are not inconsistent with Article XI:I ...."). The Panel did conclude that the Canadian Act
was inconsistent with Article 111(4). Id. at 160-61.
107. The Panel's decision clearly implies that had the purchase undertakings "prevent[ed]
the importation of goods as such" they would have been found to violate Article XI, even
though they were not quotas. Id. at 163.
108. United States-Imports of Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies, CONTRACTING
PARTIES TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS
AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS, 30TH SupP. 107 (1984).
109. Id. at 119.
110. Id. at 123.
111. Id. at 124-28.
112. Id. at 123.
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the willingness of the Contracting Parties to identify trade restrictions
regardless of form.
This view that Article XI is broadly interpreted by GATT members is
further supported by the Contracting Parties' consistent reference to the
quotas challenged under the Article as "import restrictions." To the ex-
tent that the use of terminology sometimes compartmentalizes analysis of
a particular subject, Article XI has not been constrained by reference to
its application to quotas. Since Article XI has always been applied to
import restrictions (many of which happen also to be quotas), there is
room to infer that it should apply to import restrictions which are not
quotas. The question remains, then, whether Article XI should be in-
yoked against countertrade.
B. Is Countertrade a Restrictive Trade Practice Under Article XI?
If the Contracting Parties attach to Article XI its literal meaning, gov-
ernmentally mandated countertrade can be characterized as a trade re-
striction inconsistent with Article XI. Countertrade, whether or not
governmentally mandated, is often claimed to expand trade by creating
markets where they would otherwise not exist; however, as illustrated
above, 113 countertrade may create markets where they should not exist
and simultaneously close off other markets to willing buyers through the
imposition of restrictive trade conditions. Governmentally imposed
countertrade has an adverse impact upon competition in the world mar-
ketplace because it forces purchasers to make choices based upon the
willingness of the seller to accept the terms of countertrade, rather than
choices based upon market factors. When countertrade is made a condi-
tion to trade, it has a restrictive impact upon both the buyer and seller.
In a typical counterpurchase transaction, the seller discovers at some
point in the negotiating process that in order for its trading partner to
consummate the deal, that seller must agree to buy or market its trading
partner's products.114 In some cases, the counterpurchase requirement
takes the form of a demand. Mexico and Brazil, for example, have spe-
cific laws permitting import licenses for certain products only in ex-
change for an export sales contract of equal or greater value. 1 5 In cases
where such laws are applicable, countertrade requirements clearly im-
pose quid pro quo conditions that restrict trade only to those countries
113. See supra text accompanying notes 62-74.
114. ITC ANALYSIS, supra note 29, at 3.
115. Id. at 2. The references in the text to Brazil and Mexico are intended to be illustrative
only. No connotation that either country is in violation of the GATT is intended. Mexico, of
course, is not a member of GATT.
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willing or able to accept the conditions. Thus these countertrade require-
ments can actually bar trade, in violation of Article XI.
Governments that impose countertrade requirements argue that they
use countertrade to create export markets. These countries rely on the
marketing expertise of large corporations to market counter-deliverables
in the hope that domestic firms will learn marketing strategies and main-
tain the markets.1 16 Although a secondary market may be created for
the counter-deliverables, this possibility does not remove the burden of
the countertrade requirements on the initial transaction. The creation of
new secondary markets is an extraneous concern that cannot justify
countertrade's restrictive effect upon trade any more than the social and
economic concerns invoked by France in the Hong Kong Products case
could justify barring Hong Kong products through non-quota
barriers. 117
The counterpurchase requirements imposed by Mexico and Brazil are
made effective through their licensing procedures and are similar to the
tactics employed by France to effectuate discriminatory quotas against
Hong Kong. 118 The result of the licensing practices of all three countries
is to keep out imports. Unlike the French quotas, though, the Mexican
and Brazilian licensing laws' bar is not outright, but applies against any
trader unable to meet the countertrade requirements by marketing an off-
setting volume of Brazilian or Mexican goods. In the Hong Kong Prod-
ucts case, as well, the goal of French policy was to reduce a net imbal-
ance in imports over exports. The result in the case is a discriminatory
bar of imports from all countries whose companies refuse to accept the
condition. The licensing procedures of France, Brazil, and Mexico thus
have similarly trade restrictive results. Goods that French, Mexican, and
Brazilian consumers may want and are willing to pay for are banned at
the border. The practices of Mexico and Brazil are as violative of Article
XI as the licensing procedures implemented by France.
There are other similarities between the effects of governmentally im-
posed countertrade requirements and quotas that the GATT was
designed to prevent. Countertrade requirements are not as rigid as quo-
tas, but they can be equally prohibitive for companies lacking a use or
marketing mechanism for the counter-deliverables.11 9 Public authorities
determine the sources of imports under quota systems without regard to
116. Id.
117. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
119. One author has suggested that countertrade has the same effect as a quota and, as a
result, Article XI should apply:
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market factors. Similarly, countertrade requirements frequently give pri-
ority to the willingness of a trading partner to accept the countertrade
arrangement, rather than to factors such as quality, cost, or price.
Countertrade requirements thus result in transactions based upon polit-
ical negotiations. This places trade in the midst of political conflict and
burdens trade among nations in a manner that the drafters of the GATT
attempted to avoid:
Finally, Q.R. [quantitative restriction] makes -all international commerce a
matter of political negotiation-goods move, not on the basis of quality,
service and trade, but on the basis of deals completed country by country,
product by product, and day by day between public officials. All economic
relation[s] between nations are moved into the area of political conflict.120
Thus, since governmentally mandated countertrade is trade restrictive,
and a proper interpretation of Article XI would apply its regulations to
trade restrictions beyond quotas, countertrade requirements clearly con-
situte violations of the GATT.
C. Challenging Countertrade Under GATT
Given countertrade's inconsistency with the principles of the GATT,
governmentally imposed countertrade requirements may be addressed at
two levels under the existing GATT framework. First, as in the Hong
Kong Products case, specific government countertrade requirements may
be submitted to the GATT consultation and arbitration process. As Am-
bassador David McDonald, Deputy United States Trade Representative,
has suggested, "countertrade is an indirect means of licensing imports
that should be dealt with within the GATT monitoring, consultation,
and arbitration machinery like any other trade restriction." 12 1 If the
Contracting Parties were to accept the argument that governmentally im-
posed countertrade requirements are inconsistent with Article XI, the
Government-mandated countertrade is a de facto restriction on access to a foreign mar-
ket, and because countertrade restrictions are often directed at specific products, the re-
strictions cause effects similar to those produced by quotas on such products. For
example, countertrade practices mandated through linkages of import and export licens-
ing entitlement systems constitute, in effect, a quota on imports subject to adjustment
based on the level of exports and would appear to contravene the restrictions on quotas
promulgated in Article XI.
Zarin, supra note 51, at 243-44.
120. U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/A/PV.22, at 16-17 (1947), quoted in . JACKSON, supra note 9, at
310.
121. New Restrictions on World Trade, supra note 39, at 119.
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customary sanction would be to request the discontinuance of the prac-
tice or to approve the withdrawal of equivalant concessions. 122
The withdrawal of equivalent concessions alone, however, would re-
sult in an increase in barriers to trade between the countries involved and
a decrease in economic efficiency. Furthermore, merely requesting the
discontinuance of the practice is not likely to produce the result desired.
Countries impose countertrade requirements for compelling policy rea-
sons and are likely to resist ceasing such practices.
Alternatively, countertrade could be addressed at a broader level at a
future GATT round of trade negotiations, similar to the Tokyo
Round.1 23 Such negotiations may offer a more desirable alternative to
filing complaints within the GATT organizational framework. In the
process of trade negotiations, countertrade requirements could be ex-
changed for desirable concessions from other countries. For example,
Brazil might agree to eliminate countertrade requirements if Japan and
the United States were to agree to eliminate tariff surcharges on certain
agricultural products. Brazil could generate valuable trade concessions
in this fashion. Yet bargaining for reduction in countertrade practices
would, in effect, reward countries for having imposed such requirements
in violation of the GATT. If, on the other hand, countertrade does not
become the subject of negotiation, market conditions will not improve for
the exporter in the future.
There is, therefore, no painless way to eliminate countertrade. Formal
action resulting in a finding that countertrade is inconsistent with Article
XI would most likely result in the trade-inhibitive removal of conces-
sions. Negotiations will inevitably "reward" those governments requir-
ing countertrade for actions that their trading partners should regard as
violations of the GATT. Lack of action will allow the further growth of
barter, with its resultant inefficiencies.
The most desirable result under the circumstances may well be for
countries affected by governmentally imposed countertrade requirements
not to make formal complaints under the GATT. This would avoid both
potential removals of concessions and the tainting of future negotiations
by a formal report establishing countertrade requirements as inconsistent
with the Agreement. Short of formal action, however, the injured parties
122. This sanction is in line with suggestions made in Panel Reports and is fairly typical of
sanctions under the GAT. The affected parties would be expected to consult with each other
first in order to attempt to resolve the matter. See supra note 79.
123. For a discussion of the previous rounds of trade negotiations under the GATT, see F.
MEYER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY ch. 4 (1978). For a discussion of the reductions in
non-tariff barriers accomplished at the Tokyo Round, see Jackson, GATT Machinery and the
Tokyo Round Agreements, in TRADE POLICY IN THE 1980's at 159-87 (v. Cline ed. 1983).
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should openly acknowledge the trade-restrictive effects of governmen-
tally mandated countertrade and negotiate accordingly.
Conclusion
As the practice of countertrade continues, governments committed to
a free, multilateral trade framework must ask what, if anything, should
be done about it. One response is to continue to do nothing, allowing
countertrade's continual expansion, as it has in the past twenty years.
For many, that response is unsatisfactory, both because it is contrary to
the goal of a competitive world market and because it undermines the
progress made in the past forty years (commencing with GATT) in
achieving a portfolio of multilateral and bilateral treaties promoting free
trade.
One vehicle available to challenge governmentally imposed counter-
trade requirements is the GATT. The GATT applies only to members,
however, and many NME's are not members. 124 Moreover, even if the
Contracting Parties determine that countertrade is inconsistent with the
GATT, sanctions are limited. The Contracting Parties are likely to sug-
gest further consultation among the parties involved, 125 or at most the
suspension of concessions.1 26 The latter option, though, creates addi-
tional trade barriers, contrary to the primary purpose of the GATT.
It is probably better for all parties if the injured states do not formally
refer the issue of countertrade practices to the Contracting Parties.
Thus, countertrade need not acquire the label of a GATT violation.
Rather, governmentally imposed countertrade requirements are best
treated as a negotiated item in future trade rounds. Members could then
negotiate for the removal of countertrade requirements while eliminating
other trade barriers in return. Similar trade negotiations could be initi-
ated with non-GATT members that practice countertrade.
124. Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia are members of
GATT. However, the Soviet Union and China, which account for a substantial portion of
East/West countertrade, are not bound by the GATT.
125. See GATT, supra note 9, arts. XXII and XXIII(1).
126. See id. art. XXIII(2), which states in part:
If the Contracting Parties consider that the circumstances are serious enough to justify
such action, they may authorize a contracting party or parties to suspend the application
to any other contracting party or parties of such concessions or other obligations under
this Agreement as they determine to be appropriate in the circumstances. If the applica-
tion to any contracting party of any concession or other obligation is in fact suspended,
that contracting party shall then be free, not later than sixty days after such action is
taken, to give written notice to the Executive Secretary to the Contracting Parties of its
intention to withdraw from this Agreement and such withdrawal shall take effect upon
the sixtieth day following the day on which such notice is received by him.
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Ultimately, however, trade negotiations will not resolve the underlying
problems which give rise to countertrade practices in the first place.
Many LDC's suffer from currency shortages due to lack of industrializa-
tion or demand for their products. Western nations continue to impose
restrictions on the exports from LDC's in their attempt to protect domes-
tic industries. The currency shortages suffered by the NME's are also
likely to persist as long as their output-oriented philosophies prevail.
Until these underlying conditions are altered, the incentives to engage in
countertrade will persist.
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